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Abstract
Organ trafficking is officially banned in several countries and by the main Nephrology Societies. However, this
practice is widespread and is allowed or tolerated in many countries, hence, in the absence of a universal law, the
caregiver may be asked for advice, placing him/her in a difficult balance between legal aspects, moral principles
and ethical judgments.
In spite of the Istanbul declaration, which is a widely shared position statement against organ trafficking, the
controversy on mercenary organ donation is still open and some experts argue against taking a negative stance. In
the absence of clear evidence showing the clinical disadvantages of mercenary transplantation compared to
chronic dialysis, self-determination of the patient (and, with several caveats, of the donor) may conflict with other
ethical principles, first of all non-maleficence. The present paper was drawn up with the participation of the
students, as part of the ethics course at our medical school. It discusses the situation in which the physician acts as
a counselor for the patient in the way of a sort of “reverse” informed consent, in which the patient asks advice
regarding a complex personal decision, and includes a peculiar application of the four principles (beneficence,
non-maleficence, justice and autonomy) to the donor and recipient parties.
Introduction
Almost 30 years ago, an Editorial in The Lancet entitled
“Who owns Medical Technology” told a fascinating story
of Lapps, reindeer and snowmobiles, and commented that
technology brings much more than hardware: it may lead
to a true shift in social values [1]. Indeed, new technolo-
gies bring new ethical problems and the issue of trans-
plantation is probably one of the best examples involving
several aspects of life, not only in Medicine: suffice it to
mention the “new definition” of death, i.e. brain-death,
that is at the basis of cadaveric organ donation [2–4].
The roots of bioethics are deeply planted in the history
of dialysis and of renal replacement therapy: the limited
availability of dialysis laid the foundation for the first
Ethics Committee, in Seattle, aimed at supporting the
decision of allocating dialysis treatment to a few pa-
tients, among several potential candidates [5, 6]. The
limited availability of of kidneys from cadaveric donors
currently poses similar problems in several settings
where dialysis is available without restrictions; the clin-
ical and ethical complexity is greater in limited resources
settings in which a kidney transplant is often the only
therapy potentially leading to long-term survival [5–7].
Globalization, both from a financial and from a cul-
tural point of view, puts people in touch [8]. This sets
the stage for the trade of human organs and for trans-
plant tourism, which is on the rise, thus raising extensive
and complex clinical and ethical controversy. According
to a recent review on stressful ethical issues in uremia
therapy, “the voluntary sale of purchased donor kidneys
now accounts for thousands of black market transplants
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amounting to an estimated one-quarter of all kidney
transplants performed globally” [7].
Even though many eminent medical associations con-
demn the sale of human organs, and several religious
authorities, including Pope John Paul II, have openly
spoken against organ trade because it violates ‘the dig-
nity of the human person’, the problems posed by organ
shortages continue to increase in rich as well as in poor
countries, almost ironically in parallel with the im-
provements in kidney transplantation and with the
consequent broadening of the indications, in turn increasing
the number of potential recipients [7, 9–10, 11–14]. The
need for incentives in favor of organ donation is evident al-
though the modality is a matter of controversy [15, 16].
While medical associations and individual nations
strive to find common objectives, the problem of kidneys
for sale merges into the universal issues of poverty and
exploitation [7, 17]. The current technology allows for
the broader use and trade of body parts, including
“wombs for rent” by surrogate mothers, which is legal
in some countries. However, it also poses problems
which are often, at least partly, shared by the kidney
trade [18–20].
Opponents to the ban on kidney vending object that
“paid organ donors need not be victims who have not
lost the right to determine what happens to their body”;
similar objections are posed in the case of surrogate
mothers [7, 15–17, 21].
As will be discussed later, the marketing of human or-
gans is not always illegal, and some countries actually
allow the purchase of kidneys, while in other settings,
the lack of legislation automatically becomes synonym-
ous of permission [21–27].
In this ever changing, complex and tumultuous sce-
nario, patients with severe chronic kidney disease may
have access to various “offers” via the Internet (a famous
case occurred a few years ago on e-bay), and may even
be contacted by “brokers” [28–30].
The case discussed herein is based on a patient who was
followed up in our clinical practice. His story was modi-
fied in order to respect the privacy of the patient and of
his family. This case was selected for discussion within the
course of medical ethics and EBM at the Medical School
of the University of Torino, Italy. The present report sum-
marizes the work that was done with the students who
were tutored by a nephrologist and two bioethicists.
Case history
A 65 year old man with chronic kidney disease stage 4
(GFR 20 mL/min) sought medical advice, asking his care-
giver nephrologist: “Doctor can I buy a new kidney? I've
heard it isn't prohibited in other Countries, and in any case,
I’m willing to pay as much as needed to get a new life.”
The patient’s history was unremarkable. His chronic
kidney disease was presumably on a vascular-
atherosclerotic basis. He had undergone stenting of a
renal artery 7 years earlier. After the procedure, his
blood pressure reportedly normalized and the patient
dropped out of nephrological follow-up. One and a half
years before the present discussion, he was referred to
the nephrologist after being taken to the Emergency
Room following a car accident, where high serum cre-
atinine was found (3.3 mg/dL) in the context of severe
hypertension (200/115 mmHg). At that time the patient
was not taking any medication. No evidence of recurring
renal artery stenosis was found and the patient was
started on ACE-inhibitors and Calcium antagonists for
blood pressure control, antiuricemic agents, vitamin D,
oral bicarbonate, EPO therapy and a low protein diet on
account of the need to correct the associated metabolic
derangements.
After a phase of reactive depression, the patient con-
tinued his job as the owner and manager of a medium
sized company, and maintained his traveling and social
habits, adapting to the low-protein diet intelligently and
flexibly. His family, consisting of his wife, a 20-year-old
daughter living with the family and attending the local
university, and two older sons, one of whom works with
his father, supported him in the adaptation to the life-
style changes and helped him overcome the initial op-
position to “having to take too many pills”. The issue of
living donor transplantation had been discussed within
the family, however his wife was ABO incompatible and
border-line hypertensive, while the patient himself re-
fused the idea of accepting a kidney from one of his chil-
dren. Despite good compliance to both his diet and drug
therapy, the kidney disease progressed and the patient
started undergoing clinical and imaging evaluations for
wait-listing for a cadaveric kidney graft.
The patient asked his caregiver nephrologist for
advice.
The physician as a counselor: “reverse” informed consent
The patient’s request had some peculiar characteristics:
in fact, it does not deal with the choice of a specific
treatment (kidney transplantation), which had been
agreed was potentially the most favorable choice, nor
did it deal with the idea of a related (children) or unre-
lated (wife) living donation (once more it was agreed to
be potentially useful), but with its legal, moral and eth-
ical aspects.
Answering the patient’s request does not imply having
technical knowledge (transplantation versus dialysis, liv-
ing related, or unrelated transplantation), but it does re-
quire knowledge of the social and ethical aspects of
Medicine (which are not a usual part of medical expert-
ise) as well as of the usual clinical work-up.
Piccoli et al. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine  (2015) 10:13 Page 2 of 10
Furthermore, answering the patient’s request requires
that the physician clearly define his/her role:/ i.e., a
counselor with a “parental” role, a partner in a shared
decision, or a technical expert who may refuse to answer
ethical questions that are not strictly related to his/her
work and expertise [31–33].
Each of these roles may be ethically and clinically
sound. However, the answers may be substantially differ-
ent depending on these behavioral models of patient/
physician interaction: the parental, or paternalistic
counselor would try to convince the patient that his
choice bears severe ethical problems and would under-
line the complex relationship between moral, legal and
ethical issues, notwithstanding the clinical concerns. The
partner in a shared decision would act as a friend, who
understands, listens and participates, and who gives his
opinion without attributing a value of “right or justice”.
The technical expert would explain the clinical risks,
and limit any additional indications to suggestions that
might further unravel the ethical aspects, possibly with
the help of a specialist. While the physician who follows
an exclusively technical approach may somehow avoid
the specific questions by identifying a different “technical
expert” to whom the patient can be referred, those who
follow a parental model or who pursue a therapeutic alli-
ance should go one step forward in the case analysis and
engage in an in-depth discussion with the patient.
The “double” application of the four principles
The four principles of the so-called principlist ethics
offer a useful tool for the analysis of complex ethical
problems, while integration with a more flexible narra-
tive approach may be of use in refining pragmatic strat-
egies tailored to the individual cases [34, 35].
In this case the analysis according to the four princi-
ples (beneficence, non maleficence, justice and auton-
omy) is peculiar as it deals with two individuals, the
donor and the recipient, and the benefit of one may be
in contrast with the harm of the other. Furthermore, the
concept of justice may take on different meanings since
legal justice, moral justice and ethical justice often par-
tially, but incompletely, overlap.
The definition of the principle of autonomy is likewise
complex, not only because it involves two different
choices, donating or selling, and receiving or buying, but
also because it implies a reflection on the definition (and
existence) of autonomy in the context of poverty, as
clearly stated in the first principle of the Nuremberg
code “The voluntary consent of the human subject is ab-
solutely essential [36]. This means that the person in-
volved should have legal capacity to give consent; should
be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of
choice, without the intervention of any element of force,
fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior
form of constraint or coercion; and should have suffi-
cient knowledge and comprehension of the elements
of the subject matter involved as to enable him/her
to make an understanding and enlightened decision”
[36–38].
Whether poverty is a form of constraint or coercion is
one of the central issues in the discussion on human
organ trade [39–42].
Beneficence
First actor: The recipient – the buyer
The expected benefit for the patient affected by severe
chronic kidney disease is clear: a longer, better quality
life. From a statistical point of view, the patient has a
high probability of increasing his/her life expectancy and
of improving the quality by being treated by transplant-
ation rather than by dialysis [43–45].
In the context of transplantation, provided that the
fundamental clinical requirements are met, living donor
transplantation allows better organ and patient survival
than deceased donor transplantation [46, 47]. Dialysis
vintage is negatively correlated with survival after trans-
plantation, thus leading some Authors suggest that kid-
ney transplant should be performed as early as possible
[48, 49].
However, the picture is probably more complex, and
there are at least five points that should be discussed
with the patient.
First: a statistical benefit in a population is not neces-
sarily a clinical benefit for each patient: the fact that the
results of kidney transplantation are better than those of
dialysis is not synonymous of success for “our” patient,
who should be aware of the limits of his/her clinical de-
cision (for instance, early and late loss of kidney func-
tion, increased risk of infection in the short term and
possibly of neoplasia in the long term).
Secondly, there is very little data on the long-term out-
come of kidney transplants from sold kidneys. Within
the limits of the scarce research, several added risks have
been reported, including surgical problems and severe
infections [50–55].
Thirdly, there are no published data comparing mor-
tality and morbidity on dialysis versus paid organ
transplantation.
Fourthly, the main survival comparisons between dia-
lysis and transplantation did not consider the intensive
dialysis sessions that may have an added value at least in
allowing a “safer wait” for a kidney transplant [56–58].
In conclusion, the advantages the patients assume they
will reap are at least partly true when we compare living
donor transplantation to dialysis. The perceived advan-
tages are probably over-estimated since the risks for
“tourist” transplants may be higher than transplants ob-
tained from non-mercenary donors. However, the lack of
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information on the long-term results makes this state-
ment only putative. Furthermore, since the patient con-
siders the possibility of what could be considered a
“non-conventional” transplant, the advantages of non-
conventional dialysis, albeit more intrusive in daily life,
should also be taken into consideration.
Second actor: The donor – the seller
No doubt: the only advantage for the donor is financial.
It is also well known that the donor receives only the
crumbs of the total fee paid by the recipient, the vast
majority of which goes towards honoraria and hospital
fees. The extent of the financial advantage for the donor,
or, in other terms, the degree of exploitation, varies
greatly around the world, with the fewest benefits and
the greatest risks in settings without any regulations as
compared to the few settings where strict regulations re-
garding the sale of organs are in place [59–61].
A recent, large survey from Pakistan, one of the coun-
tries regulating the sale of kidneys, highlights that be-
sides the negative effects on the donor’s health, even
though the donations had mainly been driven by the
need to pay for debts, only a minority of sellers were still
financially independent a few years after donation [60].
Non-maleficence
First actor: The recipient – the buyer
As already reported, there is an increased risk associated
with “tourist” transplantation, mainly due to an in-
creased risk of infectious diseases and of surgical com-
plications. The risks persist in the medium term, when
the patient is back home, and they are enhanced by the
fact that quite often the clinical records are not supplied
and the communication between the team that will take
over chronic care of the patient and the team that per-
formed the kidney transplantation is minimal, if there is
any at all [51–55, 62].
There seem to be some great differences among cen-
ters, and the statement that the quality of a mercenary
transplantation is always low may actually represent an
oversimplification; however, it should also be acknowl-
edged that the risks are only partially known [62].
Once more, the extent of the counseling that should
be provided merges into the discussion about the role of
the caregiver, and perhaps also about one's personal pos-
ition regarding the marketing of human organs.
Ethical and psychological issues should profoundly
matter, however, in our Medline search we did not find
any studies regarding the long-term psychological effects
of having bought a kidney. Once more, this issue may
not be simple and the equation “buyer = a person with-
out ethical concerns” may be oversimplified, and cases
like those involving our patient, who is a “good, normal
person” integrated in his society and with a satisfactory
family life, are far form rare.
In this type of situation, in which the buyer cannot be
described as a sinless shark, we may expect the long-
term integration of the “new kidney” to be more difficult
than previously thought [63–71]. This issue probably
also has important cultural differences, taking into ac-
count the perspectives of recipients in the Mediterra-
nean area as compared to Anglo-Saxon countries, and
on the basis of religious beliefs [63–74].
Second “actor”: The donor – the seller
The literature on kidney donors “for financial reasons” is
relatively scant and mainly derives from countries such
as Pakistan or Iran in which the pragmatic clinical and
legal position is in favor of a regulated market. Hence,
we may expect that this data is the “best” that is avail-
able and that the results are poorer and risks are higher
in settings where the lack of regulation leaves more
room for exploitation. Within these limitations, it has
been shown that kidney vendors are subject to greater
clinical risks as compared to other voluntary living do-
nors within the same country [75–78].
The differences in quality of life and psychological im-
pact are even more striking: even if voluntary kidney do-
nation may not always be glittering gold, the
psychological experiences of kidney vendors are highly
negative, in particular when compared to the experi-
ences of voluntary kidney donors [78–81].
Justice
There are several legitimate ways to consider justice:
justice as the fair distribution of opportunities and re-
sources; justice as a moral – ethical right, considering
the different religious points of view; justice as laws.
Justice as a fair distribution of opportunities (recipient
and donor)
The idea is that the burdens and benefits of treatments
should be distributed fairly among all groups in society.
In this regard, justice may be evaluated according to
four main areas: fair distribution (crucial in the case
of scarce resources), competing needs, rights and ob-
ligations, and potential conflicts with the established
legislation [82–86].
Once again, the distribution may be interpreted in dif-
ferent ways, for example distribution of financial re-
sources, of health care access, as well as of the
treatments themselves, as in the case of kidney trans-
plantation which is financially advantageous as com-
pared to dialysis, but kidneys from deceased donors are
not available for every patient, or at least are not avail-
able within a short period of time [87–91].
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Therefore, this concept of justice may be interpreted
differently: if justice is meant as an overall fair distribu-
tion, then there are striking differences between donor
and recipient, or in other words seller and buyer: here
the question of the obvious inequality merges into the
vast problem of poverty, leading to further exploitation
of the poor. No doubt there is a strong conflict of inter-
est between the donor and the recipient, and the need to
sell a kidney in itself suggest unequal access to the basic
needs of society, including health care.
Conversely, if the problem of justice is meant in the
sense of optimizing the limited resources of transplant-
ation, then the choice may not be unsound: the patient
is not in competition with other subjects for the limited
number of grafts available from deceased kidney donors
and, on a larger scale, since dialysis costs more than
transplantation, this choice may also be favorable to his/
her own health care system, at least in cases such as this
one in which the donor and the recipient do not reside
in the same country. But, if we shift the scenario to a
global level, we have to consider the possibility that the
clinical harm to the donor hinders the advantages for
the recipient [46, 47, 78, 79, 92–94].
The role of the physician is crucial: is he/she the advo-
cate of his/her patient and/or of his/her society, or is he/
she a global advocate of all patients in defense of human
rights?
Hence, the controversy regarding the patient’s position
inevitably merges with the enormous problem of defin-
ing the role of the physician in the present globalized so-
ciety: is the physician a skilled technician, a detached
counselor or a moral agent? [95–97].
Justice as moral understanding or as a religious
obligation (both parties)
While an extensive analysis on the different religious at-
titudes towards organ trade is far beyond the scope of
this review, a simplification of this hyper-complex sub-
ject may be a Manichean division between ethical-
religious positions, substantially banning organ trade,
and a pragmatic position, favoring the short term advan-
tage for all parties (money for the donor, kidney for the
recipient).
Moral justice is not the same as legal justice: while in
an ideal world ethical principles, moral understanding
and legal positions should probably merge, this is not an
ideal world, and the laws may be different thereby
reflecting various pragmatic, religious or social back-
grounds and choices as well [98–105].
The codes regulating the medical profession lie some-
where between an ethical-moral code and the law: in
fact, at least in some countries, in the absence of a law
an ethical code may take on the same importance as the
law. This was the case with the Nuremberg code in
Europe, but it is not the case with the Istanbul declar-
ation, that however is forcing governments to define a
clear position towards organ trafficking (as recently oc-
curred in China), and is finally trying to stop the sale of
human organs [17, 36–38, 106].
Before the Declaration of Istanbul in 2008, similar po-
sitions had already been taken, for example by the
World Health Organization: “The Guiding Principles on
Human Organ Transplantation” (1991) banning the
commercialization of human organs as 'a violation of
human rights and human dignity', and by the European
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
Concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of
Human Origin (2002), condemning organ and tissue
trafficking, calling on States to provide appropriate sanc-
tions [107, 108].
The Istanbul declaration presents two further elements
of great interest and novelty: first of all, it provides a
clear definition of organ trafficking, transplant
commercialization, and transplant tourism: “Travel for
transplantation is the movement of organs, donors, re-
cipients, or transplant professionals across jurisdictional
borders for transplantation purposes. Travel for trans-
plantation becomes transplant tourism if it involves
organ trafficking and/or transplant commercialism or if
the resources (organs, professionals, and transplant cen-
ters) devoted to providing transplants to patients from
outside a country undermine the country’s ability to pro-
vide transplant services for its own population” [106].
Secondly, for the first time in the history of Nephrol-
ogy, the Istanbul declaration- choose presents a medical
association (the ISN) as the promoter of a shared legal
position, thus interpreting the medical profession not
only as a technical one but also as a moral and social
one [106].
Justice as law
Organ trafficking has been defined as a crime that oc-
curs among vulnerable categories of people. However,
the legal definition of a crime is different from the moral
definition of a crime and several positions are present
worldwide: organ commerce may be regulated and/or
tolerated in the absence of a law, or banned by a law.
This latter position may also have different aspects: in
most of the countries where this study was undertaken,
such as Italy, that ban the organ trade, there is no men-
tion of the treatment of patients who bought a kidney in
a foreign country where this practice may be allowed,
regulated or simply tolerated. Hence, as in the example
discussed herein, the patient may receive all the care he/
she needs, regardless of the origin of his/her kidney.
In some countries, such as Germany, buying an organ
is considered a crime and the recipient is prosecuted
when he/she returns to his/her homeland [109]. Both
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positions have pros and cons: the first may reflect
greater attention to privacy and the respect of a basic
tenet of bioethics, that is, caring without judging; how-
ever, such an attitude implicitly encourages exploitation
in poorer countries (and may even be beneficial for the
health care system, as previously discussed) [110, 111].
The second position is probably more effective in pre-
venting organ trade, but once more affects the physi-
cian’s role making him/her a controller of social rights,
and a guardian of the laws [112, 113].
Autonomy: first actor, the recipient, the buyer
The Principle of Respect for Autonomy states that the
patient's preferences have to be respected as long as
the patient is informed of the benefits and risks, has
understood this information, and has given consent
[114–116].
Once more, with subjects who seek medical advice,
like our patient, the discussion shifts to the information
and to its modality, in other term, to the physician/pa-
tient relationship. It also shifts to the different boundar-
ies surrounding the transmission of the information, i.e.,
according to the relationship. In a paternalistic relation-
ship the physician would try to convince the patient of
the “right” choice, while following a technical approach
the expert would merely confront the patient with risks,
advantages and uncertainties, and through a therapeutic
alliance both parties would be expected to openly dis-
cuss their opinions and try to find a shared clinical
pathway [117–120].
Autonomy: second actor, the donor, the seller
This is probably the most crucial point that divides the ad-
vocates of the kidney trade from those who would ban it
[121–125]. Once more there are several levels of discus-
sion. The first one is quite simple: does a very poor per-
son, i.e., one who is so poor as to decide to sell one of his/
her body parts, truly have “free power of choice, without
the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit,
duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint
or coercion”, to again cite the Nuremberg declaration?
However, does the speculative decision to consider the
potential seller (who is not free in his/her choice) actu-
ally deprive this person of the only chance to improve
his/her quality of life and/or to avoid personal dramas?
Once more, the answer implies the decision of a
speculative-theoretical-philosophical position versus a
pragmatic one, inevitably shifting the discussion to a dif-
ferent level: does being a physician imply the choice of
an ethical position or is the physician a pragmatic actor
in a wider world? These positions further merge into the
concept of the human body i.e., as a whole, as a series of
pieces, as an individual good or the as the property of a
society? [28, 126, 127].
As recently underlined by a series of focus groups in
European countries, people with similar cultural and re-
ligious backgrounds may respond differently to ques-
tions on human organs, spanning from “I’m mine” to
“the body is not a car”, thus underlining, above all, the
limits and risks of oversimplification [28, 128].
A role for narrative ethics?
While principlist ethics may offer a valuable frame for
dissecting the clinical problem and for analyzing the
main issues, a narrative approach may be more apt to
identify solutions in individual cases, taking into account
the patient’s history, the presence of family support, the
presence of fears and concerns, as well as his/her daily
life and job [129–131].
It has been said that “a narrativist tries to capture the
stories” that patients and families tell about how they
came to be in a particular predicament as well as what
was behind their moral decision-making at earlier im-
portant moments [129]. The flexibility of narrativism
may compensate for the more rigid structure of the four
principles.
The history of our patient underlines the capital im-
portance of his fears of being sick that led him to ini-
tially deny his disease and then to avoid follow-up thus
leading to negative consequences. However, when com-
pelled by his clinical conditions to start a diet and to
undergo medical treatment, he was able to follow the
therapies with good compliance, also thanks to the pres-
ence of strong family support.
In spite of his (apparent) determination to buy a kid-
ney, he had asked his physician for advice, suggesting
that his convictions were probably weaker than he
claimed, implicitly asking for help and leaving room for
discussion. These considerations were at the basis of an
attempt to dissect the patient’s fears and expectations as
a guide to an empirical counseling process that also in-
volved his family (see epilogue).
Once again, attention shifts from the role of the phys-
ician as a technical albeit empathic counselor to the phys-
ician as a moral agent, a role defined as “capable of acting
with reference to right and wrong”, and who is therefore
responsible for his-her decisions [97, 132, 133]. In this re-
gard, principlism and narrative approaches have the role
to support the physician in better understanding the eth-
ical problems, enabling a “right decision”. According to
this approach, that stresses physician’s responsibility, intel-
lectual and moral virtues are needed aside clinical know-
ledge in the resolution of specific dilemmas [132, 133].
Case epilogue
During the first talk, the nephrologist mainly listened to
the patient and explained to him that in spite of the per-
sonal opinions against organ trade shared by most of the
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International Nephrology community, the physician is
not a judge, the problem of organ trade is still matter of
debate, and as a counselor, he intended to maintain the
right to express his personal opinions.
The physician also clarified that in any case, according
to the local laws, if the patient had chosen to buy a kid-
ney the physician would be able to take care of him after
kidney transplantation and, after having pointed out that
transplantation may require long hospitalization and that
it bears surgical and clinical risks, he asked the patient
to come back with his family for further discussion.
The physician also asked the patient to have a talk
with a psychologist as his choice appeared to be driven
by fear and anguish, and he also gave him a paper to
read on this issue (Kidney vending: "Yes!" or "No!" [121])
pointing out that this paper did not take into account
the presence of poverty, or criminality but was intended
to give some insights into the complexity of what, at that
moment, seemed to the patient to be a “reasonable
choice”.
The paper reported a somewhat similar case, and al-
though the report was relatively old, the physician de-
cided that it could be a good starting point for an
analysis of the problem without forcing the patient to
face the toughest aspects of commercialism (exploit-
ation, poverty etc.) right away in the first step [121].
The whole family participated in the following
meeting. The discussion followed the four basic prin-
ciples, and they discussed in detail the expected
benefit and the “non- “non detriment”, and the disad-
vantages likely to be experienced by the vendor, ac-
cording to the international literature that was
supplied to the patient and his family. The patient
was also informed that he should analyze the legal as-
pects, if necessary with a legal expert, if he decided
to go forward with his choice.
After having asked for several clarifications on life on
dialysis, and having accepted to meet a couple of young
home hemodialysis patients, the patient and his family
decided to reflect more at length on the moral and reli-
gious aspects of the problem, with the support of a cath-
olic priest who had an important role in the family.
A few weeks later, the patient reported that he had de-
cided to give up his plan, and that both he and his wife
had decided to undertake psychological support. He
started dialysis 4 months later while he was later placed
on a waiting-list for a deceased donor kidney transplant-
ation. He died of sudden death 6 months after the start
of dialysis.
The family remained on good terms with the phys-
ician, and the wife once said “ we are grateful that we
did not experience the sorrow of a sudden death abroad
after a kidney transplant carried out against his own eth-
ical principles”.
Conclusions
This is not a happy ending to the story: our patient died
while waiting for a kidney transplant. However, the fam-
ily did not perceive his death as avoidable by a timely
graft, and considered that, as grim as it was, the out-
come was not linked to a choice that conflicted with
moral and ethical rules that, in a moment of anguish,
risked being ignored.
From a clinical point of view, sudden death is more
common in dialysis patients; a possibility exists there-
fore, that had he undergone early transplantation his
outcome would have been different, taking into account
that the patient was considered a good candidate for kid-
ney transplantation. The family never asked if a timely
graft would have changed the outcome, and this point
was never touched on in the several further
conversations.
Three major points of the decisional pathway should
be be underlined: the usefulness of breaking down the
problems according to the “major” principles; the im-
portance of the patient-physician relationship also as a
pathway to undertake a narrative, personalized approach,
and the step-by-step follow-up of the decision, involving
the patient and his/her family in a discussion grounded
on the available evidence.
Single cases are not general laws, and several questions
remain open, such as the “best” degree of the physician’s
involvement in the discussion; the importance of third
party guidance, in this case the catholic priest; the level
of the information to be supplied, and the pathway of in-
formation (a “softer pathway” as was the one that was
chosen, or a “harder one” presenting the evidence on ex-
ploitation first).
Narrative ethics places the decisions in the physician’s
hands, leaving him/her to discuss (possibly with the help
of other experts) each issue adapted to what is consid-
ered “best for the single patient”, according to a deci-
sional process, that corresponds to that of “personalized
medicine” which is increasingly being identified as the
best option for patients affected by chronic diseases.
Unlike with clinical medicine, that strives to define the
single best solution, an ethical discussion should first of
all lead to the understanding that there is no single best
solution, in particular when the four principles show
multiple, critical conflicting points as is the case herein.
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